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DERIVATIVE SUITS UNDER 14a-9

Securities Regulation-Shareholder Derivative Suits Under Rule 14a-9
The judicial system continues to protect a corporate shareholder
through implementation of the rapidly expanding anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co.2 plaintiff-shareholders brought a derivative suit and a class action
in a federal district court seeking to set aside the merger of defendant AutoLite with another corporation.' As shareholders of Auto-Lite, plaintiffs
alleged that management obtained proxies through materially false and
misleading statements in violation of rule 14a-9.4 In the proxy solicitations, management recommended a vote for the merger without indicating
that Auto-Lite's directors were actually under the control of the corporation with which they contemplated merging. 5
The district court, having found the defect in the solicitation to be
material, granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed as to the causal
relationship holding that if Auto-Lite could show by a "preponderance
of probabilities" that the merger was fair and would have received
' Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 10(b) & 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j (b) &
78n(a)
(1964).
2396 U.S. 375 (1970).
' 396 U.S. at 377-78. The complaint, filed the day before the shareholder's meeting, sought an injunction against the voting of proxies obtained by allegedly misleading solicitations. However, a temporary restraining order was not sought and
the voting took place as scheduled. After the merger, the complaint was amended
to seek retrospective relief.
"17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1970), provides in part:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement.., containing any statement which, at the time and in the
light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading
with respect to any material fact ... necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading ....
This rule was promulgated under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964), which provides in part:

It shall be unlawful for any person .

.

. to solicit or to permit the use of

his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any
security... in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
'In the 108 page solicitation Auto-Lite's management recommended a vote for
the merger in bold type on page two of the pamphlet. A limited textual treatment
of the relationship between the merging corporations was set forth on the same
page with less emphasis. Statistical information relevant to this relationship was
displayed on pages 21-23 of the same pamphlet. The position of these statements
in the solicitation seemed critical to the circuit court in ruling that the misrepresentations had been material. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 433
(7th Cir. 1968).
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sufficient votes in any event, no reason would exist for setting aside the
merger. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the causal
relationship that had to be shown between the solicitation and the subsequent merger in order to establish a shareholder's cause of action.
The Supreme Court followed a two stage analysis. A defect or
omission in a proxy solicitation must first be found to be material; i.e.
"of such a character that it might have been considered important by a
reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to vote."'
Once materiality is established, the necessary causal relationship exists if
"the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the
solicitation materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction." 7 In this posture the case was remanded to consider the
question of relief.
The Court's adoption of a reasonable man test in determining the
materiality of a defect or omission was predictable. The materiality test
formulated under section 10(b) of the Securities Act s was easily adapted
to the situation of proxy solicitations. 9 Despite the fact that disputes
may arise as to what is "material," the reasonable man standard perhaps
gives the uninformed shareholder the maximum amount of protection
possible. While the lack of a precise definition of materiality may perplex
management, it is not unfair to require complete disclosure of factually
sound information in order to protect shareholder voting rights. The
shareholder must necessarily accept as true the information management
forwards to him. It is far better that he have too much information at his
disposal than too little.10
The main advantage offered by the materiality test set forth in Mills
07 396 U.S. at 384.
Id. at 385.

'E.g., SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 459-60 (2d Cir. 1968),

cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st

Cir. 1966); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIOr, 1431 n.5 (2d
ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
'E.g., General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298
F. Supp. 66, 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Walpert v. Bart, 280 F. Supp. 1006, 1011 (D.
Md. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1968).
" Too much information, however, can be as harmful as too little. Where a
lengthy solicitation is involved, perhaps a short summary containing basic information on the merging companies should be required. A similar proposal would
require that a shortened solicitation form be mailed to the shareholder separately
from cumbersome financial statements. Sowards, The Wheat Report and Reform
of Federal Securities Regudation, 23 VAND. L. REv. 495, 530-32 (1970).
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is that courts can -mold the test to varying factual situations in order
to achieve the most equitable result. Thus it is anticipated that the materiality of a defect will be easily established. The pertinent inquiry, however, is what causal connection must be shown between the material defect
and the resulting injury."1 As the Court in Mills indicated, once materiality of a defect or omission is established plaintiff-shareholders' burden
of proving a causal connection between the solicitation -and the merger
is considerably lightened.
The express language in Mills indicates that a -catisal relationship
between the misleading solicitations and the alleged injury is established
by showing first a material defect or omission and second that the solicitation, not the defect itself, was an essential link in the transaction.' 2 This
test of causation certainly eliminates subjectivity and to that extent favors
the plaintiff-shareholder. It is at least clear that reliance on the defect by
each shareholder who authorized his vote by proxy will no longer be
required to establish a cause of action.' 4 But other parts of the decision
are not so clearly resolved. The Court fails to follow its own admonition
that they deal "in an area where glib generalizations and unthinking
abstractions are major occupational hazards."' 5 Instead, the Court left
room for interpretation in two distinct areas.
' Since a private cause of action under the proxy rules was established in J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the cases have indicated that the necessity
of establishing a causal relationship is the critical issue. The conflict centered in

the Second Circuit, one district holding that allegations of a causal relationship were

essential to plaintiff's claim and conclusory allegations might be insufficient, while
another district held the contrary. Compare Robbins v. Banner Indus., 285 F.
Supp. 758, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) and Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766,
773 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) with Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 98
(E.D.N.Y. 1969) and Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356, 362 (E.D.N.Y.
1966).
12 396 U.S. at 385. In addition, the test may impliedly resolve the troublesome
question of partial invalidity. Where a misrepresentation has been made in one
aspect of a solicitation, and that aspect can be isolated from the other truthful parts,
it has been held that the solicitation would only be invalid as to the misrepesented
part. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 67 F. Supp. 326, 329 (D. Del. 1946), aff'd,
163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332, U.S. 847 (1948). By addressing
the entire solicitation, the Mills test would seem to preclude isolation of the misrepresented part. See generally Loss 972-73.
12396 U.S. at 385.
14
Id. at 384-85. See also Berman v. Thomson 312 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (N.D.
III. 1970). The Court in Mills perhaps anticipated the expansion of the reliance
concept seen in rule lOb-5 into actions brought under rule 14a-9. See W. PAINTER,
FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 103-18 (1968) [hereinafter cited as

PAINTER].
1

SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
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Of initial concern is the meaning of the term essential link. Although
several definitions are possible,'" the Court apparently viewed the term
as meaning that a solicitation of proxies was necessary in order to approve
the merger.1 For example, in Mills management controlled fifty-four
percent of the voting stock but needed two-thirds of all outstanding shares
to approve the merger.
Defining essential link in terms of what is necessary to accomplish a
particular transaction tends to be rather restrictive in light of the policy
of protecting minority shareholders. Of particular concern is the unusually
rare situation in which management controls a sufficient number of votes
to execute the merger without the necessity of securing proxies. For
example, if management controls seventy-three percent of the voting stock
when only a two-thirds vote is required to execute the merger,"8 votes cast
by proxy could not possibly alter the certainty of merger, and, according
to a strict interpretation of Mills, the solicitation would not be an essential
link. In this situation management, through the solicitation, is not seeking
unnecessary proxies; rather, it has chosen the proxy solicitation as the
mode of communication whereby shareholders may become "informationally competent to deliberate corporate matters."1 Management may be
prompted to include material misrepresentations in a proxy solicitation if
it fears that truthful disclosure and informed debate might preclude
efficient execution of the merger. If a proxy solicitation can be viewed as
a communicative device, then perhaps the essential link requirement can
be satisfied by showing that fully informed shareholders conceivably
could have altered the voting outcome through informed debate at the
shareholder's meeting.20 By defining essential link in these terms, protection is extended to the maximum number of shareholders.
Of lesser concern is the Court's synonymous use of the terms "merger"
and "injury." It is arguable that confusion could result from a misreading
16 For example, the Court might have been considering what is legally required
by the proxy rules. Rule 14(c) provides that solicitations or substantially equivalent
information will be provided the shareholder prior to any stockholder meeting. 15

U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1964), anwtding, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 14,
48 Stat.
895 (1934).
1" Ina footnote
the Court explicitly stated that it addressed only the situation
where votes cast by authority of proxies were necessary to control the outcome of
the merger. 396 U.S. at 395 n.7. Yet it cited with apparent approval Laurenzano
v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), where the shareholder's cause
of action was established even though proxies were not necessary to accomplish the
merger.
8
Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
" Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).

20 Id.
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of the opinion is the area of relief to be afforded a plaintiff-shareholder."'
The relief sought in Mills was the unwinding of the merger ;22 the "merger"
and the "injury" were one in the same. The injury, however, may be
quite separate and distinct from the merger. The most obvious example
is that the market price of the corporate share might suffer as a result
of a merger. In addition to the unwinding of the merger, plaintiffshareholder should certainly be entitled to damages for any financial
loss suffered, but he should be required to show that the merger did
in fact cause the injury. Financial loss, however, is not an essential
ingredient of a shareholder's cause of action, for requiring such an injury
would preclude effective enforcement of the proxy solicitation rules.'
One problem which can be anticipated in the near future is the expansion of Mills into the area of rule 10b-5.2 Rule 14a-9 and rule
10b-5 overlap to the extent that a merger usually results in the issuance of
stock certificates under the name of the newly formed corporation, and the
shareholder, because of this new issue, is classified as a "purchaser" of
securities.2 5 Coverage under one of the rules does not preclude coverage
under the other,26 and in fact most cases involving 14a-9 violations assert
causes of action under both anti-fraud provisions.2 7 Both rules were
designed to prevent the "insider" from profiting at the expense of the
uninformed shareholder.28 Hence, the judicial guidelines encountered
"Twice in his opinion Justice Harlan poses the problem before the Court as
being the relationship between the misleading solicitation and the merger, but the
holding is expressed in terms of the relationship between the solicitation and the
shareholder's injury. 396 U.S. at 377, 385.
22 Plaintiff-shareholders also sought attorneys' fees. See Note, Securities Regudation--Alowance of Attorneys' Fees in 14(a) Derivative Suits, 49 N.C.L. Rav.
204 (1970).
" Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (N.D. IIl. 1970).
2' 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970), provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading ....
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
25
In SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969), a re-issuing of stock
certificates following a merger was held to be a "purchase or sale" sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of rule lOb-5. See also Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380
F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
28 SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969).
2
E.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) ; Gerstle v. GambleSkogmo,
Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66 (E.D.N.Y.- 1969) ; 6 Loss 3613-14.
28
PAIxTER 264.
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under either rule can be readily applied to a particular situation to give
utmost effect to congressional policy. The most obvious example 0 is the
reasonable man standard for determining materiality promulgated under
rule lOb-5, but now utilized in cases brought under the proxy solicitation
rules.3 0
The application of a single standard to an action brought under both
rules would lend uniformity to the enforcement of the Securities Act.
However, certain judicial standards may be designed peculiarly for one
rule or the other. At present, an action brought under rule 10b-5 requires
the plaintiff to establish some causal relationship between the misrepresentation and the purchase or sale of securities. 81 Whether expressed in
terms of reliance, privity, or causation 2 this causal requirement is designed, in part, to identify the proper party plaintiff. It establishes some
"rational means of deciding who, among those trading through the vastly
impersonal medium of an exchange or over-the-counter market, should
recover and who should not.""s Thus the causation requirement actually
serves to limit defendant's liability to a defined group of individuals. On
the other hand, the proper party to bring an action under rule 14a-9 is
readily defined; he is the shareholder of the corporaiton to whom the misleading solicitation was sent. Relaxation of the causation requirement in
this instance does not increase the scope of defendant's liability, but merely
makes enforcement of the proxy rules easier by decreasing the shareholder's burden of proof. Because of the peculiar function served by the
causation requirement under rule lOb-5-imiting the scope of defendant's
liability through identification of the proper party plaintiff-it is antic"ipatedthat the abandonment of the causation requirement set forth in Mills
will not be extended into the area of rule 1Ob-5.
Even though causality is required under rule 10b-5, strong protection
is afforded the corporate shareholder. The reasonable man test of materiality leaves vast room for judicial construction in the individual cage.84
S'See notes 8 & 9 supra.
The most recent example of the adaptability of judicial standards between these
two anti-fraud provisions is found in Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D.
Ill. 1970), wherein the court applied the rationale of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-56 (2d Cir. 1968), a 10b-5 case, to an action brought under
rule 14a-9 and concluded that good faith on the part of management was no defense.
"' One commentator indicates that causation but not reliance is essential to plaintiff's cause of action. PAINTER 109.
82Id. at 103-18.
83Id. at 112.
8"An issue presented in Berman v. Thomson, 312 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill.
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The shareholder need not show a financial injury to maintain his cause
of action, for such a requirement would frustrate the enforcement of the
proxy solicitation rules. 35 Moreover, the two anti-fraud provisions of
the Securities Act usually lend support to one another as the shareholder
is increasingly given more protection. An unfortunate consequence of the
judiciary's continued support of minority shareholders is evidenced by the
power that they possess to control the outcome of corporate activities.
Indeed, the day looms near when a corporation may stand at the mercy
of one insignificant, discontented shareholder. 6 The corporate merger has
become at best a tenuous relationship. As a matter of public policy, perhaps some degree of protection should be given a corporate merger already
Indeed, the judiciary should possibly reconsider their
consummated.
interpretation of the Securities Act.
E. L.

KITTRELL SMITH

Torts-Mental Distress Damages for Racial Discrimination
In Massachuwetts Commission Against Discriminationv. Franzaroha
the Commission Against Discrimination' found that Mandred Henry, a
Negro, had been denied an apartment by the defendants solely because of
his race. The commission ordered cessation of defendants' discriminatory
rental practices' and awarded Henry compensation for his increased ex1970), was whether materiality should be determined by the jury or by the court.

It was held that when reasonable minds could not differ, the question of materiality

could be decided by the court. Although the judiciary has traditionally used this
standard to withhold issues from the jury, it would appear that the jury is especially
suited to determine whether a reasonable man would or would not have been misled.
Indeed, when a merger may stand or fall on such a fine distinction as the materiality

of information contained in a footnote of a solicitation, perhaps the question of
materiality should always be for the jury.
"5Id. at 1033.

" Perhaps the individual minority shareholder is not so powerful. In Rekant
v. Dresser, 425 F.2d 869, 876 n.7 (5th Cir. 1970), the court noted that although
the individual shareholder has a powerful weapon in section 10(b), he occupies
a fiduciary relationship with other shareholders as a consequence of his bringing

suit. This same fiduciary capacity is presumably shared by the plaintiff-shareholder
in a suit under section 14(a).

, See generally 2 Loss 956-71.
- Mass. -, 256 N.E.2d 311 (1970).
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 152B, §§ 1-10 (1957), which outlines the powers

2See

and duties of the anti-discrimination commission.

- Id. ch. 151B, § 4 (1946), which prohibits discrimination in apartment rental.

